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I. Introduction  
Article I, Section Six, Clause One of the American 
Constitution provides that Senators and Representatives:  
shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the 
Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at 
the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and 
returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in 
either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.1 
This language, known as the Speech or Debate Clause (the 
Clause), sets forth the legislative privilege.2 Like the President’s 
executive privilege, the legislative privilege permits legislators to 
refuse to disclose information protected by the Clause. Since the 
Clause’s inception, the Supreme Court has interpreted it broadly 
and has continually expanded the breadth of the privilege given 
to legislators.3 Such interpretations have enabled self-interested 
legislators to abuse the privilege by shielding their misconduct 
from the Judiciary, the Executive, and the public.4 Moreover, this 
improper broadening of the legislative privilege has precluded 
needed inquiry into legislators’ actions.5 
The Supreme Court has not indicated whether the privilege 
granted by the Speech or Debate Clause permits legislators to 
refuse to disclose documents relating to legislative actions.6 The 
                                                                                                     
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 2. Id.  
 3. See infra Part II (discussing the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause 
as set forth by the Supreme Court).  
 4. See infra Part IV (discussing legislators’ ability to hide misconduct 
because of the broadening of the Speech or Debate Clause).  
 5. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the need for legislative accountability).  
 6. See infra Part III (indicating that the Supreme Court has not 
determined whether the Speech or Debate Clause includes a document 
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Ninth and D.C. Circuits, however, have considered this question.7 
The D.C. Circuit broadly interpreted the Clause and determined 
that it privileges legislators’ documents.8 In contrast, the Ninth 
Circuit decided that when the legislative action at issue is not 
protected by the privilege, the Clause does not prohibit the review 
of relevant documents referencing legislative acts.9  
In Part II, this Note explains the current interpretation of 
the Speech or Debate Clause as set forth by Supreme Court 
decisions. Part III discusses the D.C. and Ninth Circuit cases 
creating the circuit split regarding the privilege’s application to 
document disclosure. Part IV analyzes the Speech or Debate 
Clause using textual, historical, and ethical constitutional 
interpretive methods. Finally, Part V proposes a new test for 
applying the Speech or Debate Clause that will answer the 
question of document disclosure and narrow the scope of the 
privilege. 
II. Supreme Court Decisions: Defining the Scope of the Speech 
or Debate Clause 
To narrow the scope of the legislative privilege and thereby 
attempt to curb its abuse, it is important to understand the 
current interpretation of the Clause as set forth by the Supreme 
Court. In its numerous decisions addressing the scope of the 
Speech or Debate Clause,10 the Court has provided legislators 
with a very powerful protection.11 For instance, it has indicated 
                                                                                                     
nondisclosure privilege).  
 7. See infra Part III (discussing the circuit split between the D.C. and 
Ninth Circuits regarding the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause).  
 8. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 663 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Accordingly, we hold that a search that allows agents of the 
Executive to review privileged materials without the Member’s consent violates 
the Clause.”). 
 9. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating 
that “the alleged choices and actions for which [Renzi was] prosecuted [lay] 
beyond [the] limits” of the Speech or Debate Clause and declining to find a 
document “non-disclosure privilege”). 
 10. See infra Part II.A−B (discussing Supreme Court decisions defining the 
Speech or Debate Clause’s scope).  
 11. See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501−03 
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that, when the privilege applies, it applies absolutely.12 The Court 
has also stated that the Clause must be “read broadly to 
effectuate its purposes.”13 
In addition to giving legislators a robust privilege, 
throughout its decisions, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
two distinct portions of the Speech or Debate Clause: (1) “Speech 
or Debate in either House” and (2) “shall not be questioned in any 
other Place.”14 
A. Defining “Speech or Debate” 
In Kilbourn v. Thompson,15 the first Supreme Court case 
considering the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court rejected the 
narrowest interpretation of the phrase “speech or debate.”16 
Rather than limiting the Clause to its literal meaning, the Court 
concluded that “speech or debate” also includes “things generally 
done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to 
the business before it.”17 For example, the Court explained that 
written reports, resolutions, and voting all constitute privileged 
“speech or debate.”18 
                                                                                                     
(1975) (discussing the powerful privilege granted by the Speech or Debate 
Clause); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966) (same).  
 12. See, e.g., Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501 (indicating that “the prohibitions of 
the Speech or Debate Clause are absolute” (citations omitted)).  
 13. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180.  
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.  
 15. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204−05 (1880) (holding that a 
resolution by defendant members of the House of Representatives was 
privileged by the Speech or Debate Clause).  
 16. See id. at 204 (explaining that a narrow construction of the Clause, 
which would “limit [the privilege] to words spoken in debate,” would not be 
adopted).  
 17. See id.; see also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617−18 (1972) 
(quoting with approval the expansive interpretation of the Speech or Debate 
Clause set forth in Kilbourn); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 
(1966) (same).  
 18. See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204 (“The reason of the [Clause] is as forcible 
in its application to written reports presented in that body by its committees, to 
resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and 
to the act of voting, whether it is done vocally or by passing between the 
tellers.”).  
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In Tenney v. Brandhove,19 the Court followed the expansive 
interpretation of the phrase “speech or debate” set forth in 
Kilbourn.20 The Tenney Court determined that an investigation 
by a legislative committee was within “the sphere of legitimate 
legislative activity” covered by the privilege.21 The Court 
explained that a broad interpretation of the Clause is necessary 
to enable legislators to fulfill their roles as lawmakers.22 In 
reaching its conclusion the Court asserted that to “exceed[] the 
bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there was a 
usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the 
                                                                                                     
 19. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378−79 (1951) (holding that a 
committee investigation was protected by the legislative privilege because it did 
not clearly impinge upon the powers of another branch of the federal 
government). The Court considered whether defendant legislators could be 
subject to civil liability for requiring plaintiff Brandhove to appear at a 
committee hearing. Id. at 370−72. A committee of California legislators, “the 
Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Unamerican Activities,” summoned 
Brandhove to appear before it at a committee hearing. Id. at 369−70. Brandhove 
appeared, but refused to testify. Id. at 370. Consequently, the state courts held 
him in contempt. Id. at 371. Brandhove then brought a claim seeking damages 
in which he asserted that the committee hearing “‘was not held for a legislative 
purpose.’” Id. He argued that the hearing was instead held to prevent him from 
“‘effectively exercising his constitutional rights.’” Id. The Court first explained 
that “acts done within the sphere of legislative activity” could not subject 
legislators to civil liability. Id. at 376. The Court then considered whether the 
committee action constituted a privileged legislative act. Id. The Court stated 
that in order for legislators to fulfill their role as lawmakers, “the cost and 
inconvenience and distractions of a trial” must be avoided. Id. at 377. The Court 
concluded that a broad privilege is necessary to accomplish this goal. Id. 
Additionally, the Court explained that the voting process rather than the courts 
should be used to correct legislative abuse. Id. at 378. Finally, the Court stated 
that for legislative action to be outside the privilege, it must clearly encroach 
upon the power of the Executive or the Judiciary. Id. The Court found that the 
committee hearing did not reach this high standard, and the action was 
protected from civil suit by the legislative privilege. Id. at 378−79.  
 20. See id. at 378 (stating that “[t]o find that a [legislative action] has 
exceeded the bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there was a 
usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive”); 
see also Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204 (stating that the legislative privilege extends 
to “things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in 
relation to the business before it”).  
 21. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376−79. 
 22. See id. at 377 (“Legislators are immune from deterrents to the 
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence 
but for the public good.”).  
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Executive.”23 Moreover, the case made clear that a mere 
allegation of a legislator’s improper motive does not terminate 
the privilege.24 
In spite of the expansive definition of “speech or debate,” 
the Court has indicated that there is a limit to which actions 
by legislators will qualify as privileged legislative acts.25 For 
example, in Gravel v. United States,26 although the Court 
agreed with prior cases stating that the privilege’s scope is not 
limited to literal speech and debate, it emphasized that 
“[l]egislative acts are not all-encompassing.”27 Gravel provided 
                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 378.  
 24. See id. at 377 (“The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the 
privilege.”).  
 25. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (“Legislative 
acts are not all-encompassing.”); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) 
(“This Court has not hesitated to sustain the rights of private individuals when 
it found Congress was acting outside its legislative role.” (citations omitted)).  
 26. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618, 624−25 (1972) (holding 
that although the legislative privilege “applies not only to a Member but also to 
his aides,” the privilege does not extend to actions that do not fall within the 
legitimate legislative sphere). The Court considered whether a subpoena 
requiring Senator Gravel’s aide, Rodberg, to testify in an investigation into 
possible criminal conduct relating to the disclosure and publication of top-secret 
national defense information, known as the Pentagon Papers, violated the 
legislative privilege. Id. at 608−09. Senator Gravel, as chairman, called an 
evening meeting of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate 
Public Works Committee. Id. at 609. At the meeting, he read large portions of 
the Pentagon Papers to the subcommittee and had the entire forty-seven 
volumes of the papers placed into the public record. Id. Rodberg helped Senator 
Gravel prepare for and hold the subcommittee meeting. Id. A few weeks later, 
Senator Gravel had the papers published by Beacon Press. Id. at 609−10. First, 
the Court explained that for legislators to be adequately protected from the 
Executive and Judiciary, the legislative privilege must shield legislators’ aides 
from questioning. Id. at 616−18. The Court then determined the extent to which 
the Clause protected Senator Gravel from inquiry regarding the crime. Id. at 
622. The Court discussed the history of the Clause and noted that “the English 
legislative privilege was not viewed as protecting republication of an otherwise 
immune libel on the floor of the House.” Id. Similarly, the Court concluded that 
although the Senator could not be questioned about the subcommittee meeting 
itself, his involvement in the publication of the papers was not a privileged 
legislative act. Id. at 616, 626. Thus, the Court held that the Speech or Debate 
Clause did not protect Rodberg from testifying in the criminal investigation 
about his own involvement and that of Senator Gravel in arranging the 
publication of the Pentagon Papers. Id. at 626−27.  
 27. See id. at 624−25. 
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a test for determining which actions beyond literal speech and 
debate can be classified as immune legislative acts.28 To be 
privileged under the Gravel standard, a legislator’s action must 
be “an integral part of the deliberative and communicative 
processes by which Members participate in committee and 
House proceedings with respect to the consideration and 
passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to 
other matters which the Constitution places within the 
jurisdiction of either House.”29 This standard vastly decreases 
the number of activities that will be deemed immune 
legislative acts under the Clause.30 
Additionally, Gravel emphasized that a senator who 
violates criminal law, in his role as a legislator, cannot avoid 
liability by simply asserting the legislative privilege.31 In the 
case of Senator Gravel, this meant he could be asked about his 
involvement with the publication of confidential national 
defense papers because this was a nonprivileged violation of 
criminal law.32 He could not, however, be forced to answer 
questions regarding the subcommittee meeting at which he had 
portions of the confidential papers read into the public record.33 
The Court ultimately held that the Speech or Debate Clause 
could not legitimize Senator Gravel’s aide’s refusal to testify 
before a grand jury about his or the Senator’s criminal action.34 
                                                                                                     
 28. See id. at 625 (giving a standard for determining which acts are 
privileged by the Speech or Debate Clause).  
 29. Id. 
 30. See Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege 
and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1118 (1973) (stating that 
in Gravel, “a split Court held that the scope of activities protected by the clause 
is very narrow and does not include publication of the record or receipt of the 
material for use in committee”).  
 31. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 626 (1972) (stating that the 
Speech or Debate Clause “does not privilege either Senator or aide to violate an 
otherwise valid criminal law in preparing for or implementing legislative acts”). 
 32. See id. at 626 (“If republication of these classified papers would be a 
crime under an Act of Congress, it would not be entitled to immunity under the 
Speech or Debate Clause.”).  
 33. See id. at 616 (“We have no doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made 
to answer—either in terms of questions or in terms of defending himself from 
prosecution—for the events that occurred at the subcommittee meeting.”). 
 34. See id. at 626−27 (“The Speech or Debate Clause does not in our view 
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On the same day that Gravel was decided,35 the Court, in 
Brewster v. United States,36 applied a similar standard for 
interpreting legislative acts under the Clause.37 The Court 
explicitly stated that the Kilbourn standard should not be 
expanded to include in the privilege “everything . . . ‘related’ to 
the office of a Member.”38 If such a standard were implemented, 
legislators could characterize nearly every action as somehow 
related to the legislative process.39 To avoid this impermissible 
broadening, the Court restricted the privilege to questioning 
about legislators’ actions and motivations that are “clearly a part 
of the legislative process.”40 Like in Gravel, when applying this 
                                                                                                     
extend immunity to Rodberg, as a Senator’s aide, from testifying before the 
grand jury about the arrangement between Senator Gravel and Beacon Press or 
about his own participation, if any, in the alleged transaction . . . .”).  
 35. See generally id. (indicating that the case was decided on June 29, 
1972); Brewster v. United States, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) (same).  
 36. See Brewster v. United States, 408 U.S. 501, 528−29 (1972) (holding 
that “under these statutes and this indictment, prosecution of appellee is not 
prohibited by the Speech or Debate Clause”). The Court considered which 
actions by legislators qualify as immune legislative acts under the Speech or 
Debate Clause. Id. at 503. Senator Brewster was charged with accepting a bribe 
in return for promises regarding postage rate legislation. Id. at 502. Senator 
Brewster argued that his actions were privileged under the Speech or Debate 
Clause and the indictment must be dismissed. Id. at 503. The Court disagreed 
with Senator Brewster. Id. at 528−29. It explained that although past cases 
have defined a legislative act “as an act generally done in Congress in relation to 
the business before it,” the privilege is not unlimited. Id. at 512. The Court 
noted that there are a number of activities that are in some sense related to 
legislative activity but are not protected under the Clause because they are not 
“clearly a part of the legislative process.” Id. at 512−13, 516. The Court 
emphasized that a strong link to the legislative process is necessary to prevent 
legislators from avoiding criminal prosecution. Id. at 520. The Court concluded 
that Senator Brewster’s actions were not privileged because accepting a bribe 
was in no way “part of the legislative process or function.” Id. at 525, 528−29. 
 37. See id. at 515−16 (“In every case thus for [sic] before this Court, the 
Speech or Debate Clause has been limited to an act which was clearly a part of 
the legislative processthe due functioning of the process.”). 
 38. Id. at 513−14. 
 39. See id. at 516 (stating that if the Speech or Debate Clause was 
construed to extend the legislative privilege “to include all things in any way 
related to the legislative process,” there would be “few activities in which a 
legislator engages that he would be unable somehow to ‘relate’ to the legislative 
process”).  
 40. Id.  
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standard to the facts, the Court determined that accepting a bribe 
does not meet the legislative act standard and was therefore not 
privileged.41 
Although it appears that the Supreme Court has attempted 
to narrow the legislative act definition,42 a number of cases have 
permitted legislators’ actions to be privileged in disconcerting 
circumstances.43 In Doe v. McMillan,44 school children’s parents 
                                                                                                     
 41. See id. at 526 (stating that “[t]aking a bribe is, obviously, no part of the 
legislative process or function” and is therefore not a privileged legislative 
action).  
 42. See id. at 515−16 (“[T]he Speech or Debate Clause has been limited to 
an act which was clearly a part of the legislative process—the due functioning of 
the process.”); United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (stating that 
not every action taken by a legislator will be privileged, and to be privileged 
under the Clause, an action must be essential to carrying out the individual’s 
duties as a legislator); see also Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 
491, 504 (1975) (applying the standard set forth in Gravel for determining 
whether activities qualify as immune legislative acts (citing Gravel, 408 U.S. at 
625)).  
 43. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 507 (“We conclude that the Speech or Debate 
Clause provides complete immunity for the Members for issuance of this 
subpoena.”); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312−13 (1973) (“Congressmen and 
their aides are immune from liability for their actions within the ‘legislative 
sphere . . . .’”(quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 624−25)). 
 44. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 324 (1973) (holding that “the Court 
of Appeals applied the immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause and of the 
doctrine of official immunity too broadly”). The Court considered the scope of the 
Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at 307. The House of Representatives directed the 
Committee on the District of Columbia to carry out an investigation. Id. As part 
of the investigation, the Committee collected academic information about 
specific students. Id. at 308. The report was presented at Committee hearings, 
given to the Speaker of the House, and voted on for publication. Id. at 312. 
Additionally, the report was printed and given to members of Congress for 
“legislative purposes.” Id. Parents of children who were identified in the report 
brought suit for a violation of theirs “and their children’s statutory, 
constitutional, and common-law rights to privacy.” Id. at 309. The Court 
considered whether the investigation and use of the children’s information 
should be protected by the legislative privilege. Id. at 309−11. The Court stated 
that to be immune under the privilege, the actions must fall “within the 
‘legislative sphere.’” Id. at 312 (citation omitted). The Court noted that actions 
that qualify as legislative acts can be privileged even though in other situations 
they would violate the law. Id. at 312−13. Additionally, the Court stated that it 
is not the role of the Judiciary to question the necessity of congressional action 
taken within the legislative sphere. Id. at 313. The Court held that the 
authorization of the investigation, the actual investigation, the disclosure of the 
information at the hearings, and the preparation, publication, and distribution 
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sued legislators and their aides who collected information from 
schools about the children.45 The parents claimed a violation of 
theirs “and their children’s statutory, constitutional, and 
common-law rights to privacy.”46 The Court stated that the 
investigation, the presentation of the information at Committee 
hearings, and the referral of the report to the Speaker of the 
House were all privileged legislative acts.47 The information 
remained privileged when it was “distributed to and used for 
legislative purposes by Members of Congress, congressional 
committees, and institutional or individual legislative 
functionaries.”48 The Court indicated that acts within the 
“‘legislative sphere’” are privileged even if in other situations they 
would be considered unconstitutional or a violation of local law.49 
The Court’s only constraint on this extremely broad 
interpretation of the privilege was its statement that it did not 
extend to those who, by congressional authorization, provided the 
materials to the public in violation of the Constitution and other 
laws.50 
                                                                                                     
of the report to Committee members were privileged legislative acts. Id. at 313. 
The Court also held that, despite congressional authorization, defendants who 
made the information available to the public at large were not acting within the 
legislative sphere. Id. at 316. Thus, their actions were not privileged. Id.  
 45. See id. at 309 (stating that petitioners brought suit on behalf of their 
children against various members of the House Committee on the District of 
Columbia).  
 46. Id.  
 47. See id. at 312 (stating the Clause protected Congressmen-Committee 
members, the Committee staff, the consultant, and the investigator who 
“introduce[ed] material at Committee hearings that identified particular 
individuals, . . . referr[ed] the report that included the material to the Speaker 
of the House, and [who] vot[ed] for publication of the report”). 
 48. Id.  
 49. See id. at 312−13 (“Congressmen and their aides are immune from 
liability for their actions within the ‘legislative sphere’ even though their 
conduct, if performed in other than legislative contexts, would in itself be 
unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 50. See id. at 316 (stating that defendants who provided the information to 
the public, pursuant to congressional authorization, were not protected by the 
privilege).  
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Similarly, in Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund,51 
the Court determined that a senator’s questionable actions fell 
within the scope of the privilege, despite the attempted 
narrowing of the legislative act definition.52 In this case, Senator 
Eastland signed a subpoena in his role as chairman of a Senate 
subcommittee.53 The organization affected by the subpoena 
claimed it violated its constitutional rights and sought an 
injunction that would prevent its enforcement.54  
The Court applied the test created in Gravel.55 It determined 
that investigation and inquiry qualify as legislative acts because 
they are “an integral part of the legislative process.”56 The Court 
emphasized that the investigation was protected by the privilege 
                                                                                                     
 51. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 507 (1975) (“We 
conclude that the Speech or Debate Clause provides complete immunity for the 
Members for issuance of this subpoena.”). The Court considered whether a 
subpoena issued by Senator Eastland, in his role as chairman of a Senate 
subcommittee, fell within the “‘sphere of legitimate legislative activity’” 
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at 494, 501. In 1970, the Senate 
authorized the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security to conduct an 
investigation of the Internal Security Act of 1950. Id. at 493. Acting under this 
authority, the Subcommittee initiated an investigation of the United States 
Servicemen’s Fund, Inc. (USSF). Id. While carrying out the examination, 
Senator Eastland signed a subpoena duces tecum, which was issued to USSF’s 
bank. Id. at 494. Consequently, USSF brought an action seeking an injunction 
that would prevent the enforcement of the subpoena. Id. at 496. USSF claimed 
that the subpoena was aimed as silencing the organization in violation of the 
First Amendment. Id. at 495. In determining whether the act of issuing the 
subpoena should be privileged, the Court reaffirmed the test for legislative 
action set forth in prior cases. Id. at 501−04. The Court then determined that 
subpoenas have “long been held to be a legitimate use by Congress of its power 
to investigate.” Id. at 504 (citation omitted). Thus, the Court concluded that the 
legislative privilege protected the legislators who authorized the subpoena. Id. 
at 507.  
 52. See id. at 507 (“We conclude that the Speech or Debate Clause provides 
complete immunity for the Members for issuance of this subpoena.”). 
 53. See id. at 494 (stating that Senator Eastland approved a subpoena 
duces tecum).  
 54. See id. at 495−96 (stating that the United States Servicemen’s Fund, 
Inc. sought an injunction claiming that the subpoena violated the First 
Amendment).  
 55. See id. at 504 (quoting the Gravel standard for determining whether 
actions qualify as immune legislative acts). 
 56. Id. at 504−05. 
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because it was connected to a permissible function of Congress.57 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished Eastland’s 
facts from prior cases in which illegal actions by legislators were 
not privileged.58 For example, the Court explained that in 
Kilbourn, the individual who carried out an illegal arrest was not 
immune because his action was not “‘essential to legislating.’”59 In 
contrast, according to the Court, the Eastland subpoena was 
privileged because it was made in an investigation relating to a 
topic that could be the subject of lawmaking.60 This was found to 
be true despite the alleged violation of the Constitution. 
Finally, it is important to note that the legislative privilege 
only applies to legislative actions that have been completed.61 As 
explained in United States v. Helstoski,62 “[p]romises by a 
                                                                                                     
 57. See id. at 505−06 (“The particular investigation at issue here is related 
to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress.” (citing Watkins v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957))).  
 58. See id. at 507−08 (explaining that respondents had pointed to language 
in Gravel to argue that the subpoena should not be privileged because it violated 
their right to privacy (citing Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 621 (1972))). 
The Court, however, disagreed and distinguished the cases. Id. at 508. 
 59. Id. at 508 (citation omitted).  
 60. See id. (stating that the action in this case was privileged because it 
was “a routine subpoena intended to gather information about a subject on 
which legislation may be had” (citing Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 
(1955))).  
 61. See Jay Rothrock, Striking a Balance: The Speech or Debate Clause’s 
Testimonial Privilege and Policing Government Corruption, 24 TOURO L. REV. 
739, 752 (2008) (“[T]he Court in United States v. Helstoski held that the term 
‘legislative acts’ extends only to those past acts which have already taken 
place.”(citation omitted)). 
 62. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 489 (1979) (holding that 
the Speech or Debate Clause protects “references to past legislative acts of a 
Member” from required disclosure). The Court considered the effect of the 
Speech or Debate Clause on the admissibility of legislative act evidence in a 
former congressman’s criminal trial. Id. at 479. Respondent Helstoski, a former 
member of the House, was on trial for allegedly receiving payment in return for 
promises of legislative action, which he eventually carried out. Id. Specifically, 
Helstoski accepted money and in return introduced immigration bills that were 
favorable to aliens. Id. Helstoski appeared before a grand jury on numerous 
occasions and eventually claimed his indictment must be dismissed under the 
Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at 484. The district court did not dismiss the 
indictment. Id. It did, however, state that the Speech or Debate Clause 
prohibited the Government from introducing evidence of completed legislative 
acts at trial. Id. The Government appealed, arguing that completed legislative 
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Member to perform an act in the future are not legislative acts.”63 
Thus, they are not immune under the Speech or Debate Clause.64 
B. Defining “shall not be questioned in any other Place” 
In determining the scope of the legislative privilege, the 
Supreme Court has also interpreted the meaning of the phrase 
“shall not be questioned in any other Place.”65 The Supreme 
Court has determined that this language of the Speech or Debate 
Clause provides legislators with testimonial66 and liability 
privileges.67 
The suggestion of a testimonial privilege first arose in United 
States v. Johnson.68 In Johnson, the lower court concluded that 
                                                                                                     
acts should be admissible in order to show the respondent’s motive for accepting 
the bribe. Id. at 485. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the case law 
“leave[s] no doubt that evidence of a legislative act of a Member may not be 
introduced by the Government.” Id. at 487 (citations omitted). The Court 
indicated that the fact that this holding may make prosecutions more difficult is 
irrelevant. Id. at 488. Finally, the Court stated that promises of future 
legislative acts will not be privileged under the Clause. Id. at 489.  
 63. Id. at 489. 
 64. See id. (indicating that the Clause does not protect legislators from 
inquiry about legislative acts that may occur in the future). 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 66. See, e.g., United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (stating that 
a senator cannot “be made to answer . . . in terms of questions” about a 
legislative act); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966) (“We see no 
escape from the conclusion that such an intensive judicial inquiry, made in the 
course of a prosecution by the Executive Branch under a general conspiracy 
statute, violates the express language of the Constitution and the policies which 
underlie it.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502−03 
(1975) (explaining that the Speech or Debate Clause provides legislators with 
“protection against civil as well as criminal actions, and against actions brought 
by private individuals as well as those initiated by the Executive Branch” ). 
 68. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 184−85 (1966) (holding that 
a conviction based on a criminal statute that is obtained by questioning a 
legislator about legislative action is a violation of the Speech or Debate Clause). 
The Court considered whether a former congressman’s conspiracy conviction 
could be overturned because of a violation of the Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at 
171. The lower court found former Congressman Johnson guilty of conspiracy. 
Id. Johnson had agreed to persuade the Department of Justice to dismiss 
charges against a loan company in exchange for funds from the company. Id. at 
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former Congressman Johnson had agreed to persuade the 
Department of Justice to dismiss charges against a loan company 
in exchange for funds from the company.69 Additionally, the lower 
court found that Johnson had agreed to make a speech in the 
House that would support the loan company.70 The Supreme 
Court, however, held that Johnson’s legislative privilege had been 
violated because the conviction was obtained through inquiry into 
the circumstances and motives of a speech made in the House.71 
Although the Court found in favor of Johnson, it made clear that 
its decision is limited to the facts of the case.72 The Clause cannot 
be used to prohibit a criminal conviction that is not based on 
inquiry into privileged legislative action.73  
The testimonial privilege initially suggested in Johnson was 
specifically recognized in Gravel.74 Gravel indicated that the 
                                                                                                     
171−72. Additionally, Johnson had agreed to make a speech in the House that 
would support the loan company. Id. The conspiracy conviction, however, was 
set aside by the court of appeals due to a claim that questioning Johnson about 
his agreement to make the speech in return for payment violated the Speech or 
Debate Clause. Id. at 171. The Court first explained that the Speech or Debate 
Clause clearly does not cover “conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to 
influence the Department of Justice, that is in no wise related to the due 
functioning of the legislative process.” Id. at 172. The Court next considered the 
Government’s inquiry about the speech. Id. at 173−76. The Government had 
questioned Johnson about who wrote the speech, the reasons for certain 
statements contained in the speech, and the motives for its delivery. Id. The 
Court subsequently held that this type of questioning violated the Speech or 
Debate Clause. Id. at 184−45; see also Rothrock, supra note 61, at 751 n.45 
(stating that “Johnson implies the creation of the testimonial privilege”). 
 69. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 171−72 (explaining the charges against former 
Congressman Johnson).  
 70. See id. (explaining the bribe accepted by Johnson).  
 71. See id. at 184−85 (holding that a criminal conviction based on 
questioning about legislative actions violated the Speech or Debate Clause).  
 72. See id. at 185 (“We emphasize that our holding is limited to 
prosecutions involving circumstances such as those presented in the case before 
us.”).  
 73. See id. (“Our decision does not touch a prosecution which, though as 
here founded on a criminal statute of general application, does not draw in 
question the legislative acts of the defendant member of Congress or his motives 
for performing them.”).  
 74. See Rothrock, supra note 61, at 751 n.45 (“[M]any courts cite [the 
testimonial privilege’s] creation to Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615, 
616 (1972), which first explicitly articulated and applied the privilege impliedly 
created in Johnson.”).  
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testimonial privilege permits legislators and their aides to refuse 
to testify about legislative acts.75 Additionally, the testimonial 
privilege can be used to immunize qualifying legislative acts from 
being admitted into evidence at trial.76 This will not, however, 
prevent a legislator from being convicted through questioning 
about actions not protected by the Clause.77 
In addition to the testimonial privilege, the Clause provides a 
powerful immunity against liability.78 Thus, when a legislator is 
acting within the legislative sphere,79 his actions are immune 
from suit.80 The immunity against liability protects 
congressmen’s legislative acts from being the subject of civil and 
criminal actions.81  
In Eastland, the Court cited numerous cases confirming that 
the Clause provides a very broad immunity privilege.82 Eastland 
explained that this expansive interpretation is necessary to 
ensure that legislators can carry out their legislative tasks 
without the threat of suit.83 The Court reasoned that both civil 
and criminal actions “create[] a distraction and force[] Members 
to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative 
                                                                                                     
 75. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (stating that the 
Senator and his aide could not be forced to testify about the Subcommittee 
meeting). 
 76. See Rothrock, supra note 61, at 751 (“[A] testimonial privilege may be 
asserted to prevent the admission of legislative acts into evidence . . . .”).  
 77. See id. (“[T]he legislator can still be prosecuted based upon the 
unprotected evidence.”). 
 78. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502−03 (1975) 
(discussing the Clause’s protection against civil and criminal actions and those 
brought by the Executive). 
 79. See supra Part II.A (defining which actions by legislators qualify as 
privileged legislative acts). 
 80. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503 (“We reaffirm that once it is determined 
that Members are acting within the ‘legitimate legislative sphere’ the Speech or 
Debate Clause is an absolute bar to interference.” (citing Doe v. McMillan, 412 
U.S. 306, 314 (1973))).  
 81. See id. at 502 (stating that the Clause “protect[s] against civil as well as 
criminal actions”).  
 82. See id. at 502−03 (citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 
(1973), and Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967)).  
 83. See id. at 503 (explaining the negative implications of lawsuits on 
legislators’ ability to perform their legislative duties).  
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tasks to defend the litigation.”84 This unnecessary “distraction” 
can impinge the legislative process.85 Additionally, the Judiciary’s 
involvement threatens “legislative independence,” which the 
Clause was designed to protect.86  
III. The Circuit Split: The Speech or Debate Clause and Its 
Application to Document Review 
An issue that has not been addressed by the Supreme Court 
is the Speech or Debate Clause’s application to governmental 
review of a legislator’s documents in an investigation into the 
legislator’s alleged misconduct.87 The resolution of this issue 
depends on whether document review falls within the purview of 
the phrase “shall not be questioned in any other Place.”88 
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue,89 the 
Ninth and D.C. Circuits have each drawn a different conclusion 
regarding the breadth of the privilege, creating a split among the 
circuits.90 
                                                                                                     
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  
 87. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 659 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (indicating that the Supreme Court has not addressed the 
Speech or Debate Clause’s application to document disclosure).  
 88. See id. at 659−60 (considering whether the testimonial privilege 
“includes a non-disclosure privilege”). 
 89. See id. at 659 (“The Supreme Court has not spoken to the precise issue 
at hand.”).  
 90. Compare United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he Clause does not incorporate a non-disclosure privilege as to any branch.” 
(citations omitted)), with Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 663 (“[W]e hold that a search 
that allows agents of the Executive to review privileged materials without the 
Member’s consent violates the Clause.”). 
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A. The D.C. Circuit: United States v. Rayburn House Office 
Building 
In United States v. Rayburn House Office Building,91 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit considered the propriety of a search of former 
Congressman Jefferson’s office in light of the privilege conferred 
by the Speech or Debate Clause.92 This case is significant because 
the search was the first time that the Executive had ever ordered 
a search of a sitting congressman’s office.93 Not surprisingly, 
Jefferson challenged the search, asserting a violation of the 
Speech or Debate Clause.94 
                                                                                                     
 91. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 663 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that “a search that allows agents of the Executive to 
review privileged materials without the Member’s consent violates the Clause”). 
The court considered the application of the Speech or Debate Clause to searches 
performed by the Executive Branch. Id. at 655. Additionally, the court 
determined the proper remedy for a violation of the Clause. Id. at 663−66. The 
Department of Justice issued a search warrant for former Representative 
William J. Jefferson’s office. Id. at 656. The warrant was issued in an 
investigation surrounding Jefferson’s alleged involvement in a bribery scheme. 
Id. It was believed that Jefferson had accepted payments from businesses and in 
return promised to use his position in Congress to promote legislation 
benefitting those paying him. Id. The warrant permitted FBI agents to collect 
information from Jefferson’s office. Id. Then, a “filter team” reviewed the 
information and was instructed to remove documents that “were not responsive 
to the search warrant” or “were subject to the Speech or Debate Clause 
privilege.” Id. at 656−57. The circuit court was given documents labeled 
“potentially privileged” to determine if they were in fact covered by the Clause. 
Id. at 657. Jefferson argued that the search violated his legislative privilege. Id. 
The court pointed to Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 
408, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1995), in which it held that “the Clause includes a non-
disclosure privilege” in civil suits. Id. at 660. The court reasoned that a 
nondisclosure privilege applies in criminal actions as well. Id. The court 
determined that the privilege was violated because the Executive had access to 
privileged documents before Jefferson had the opportunity to claim that they 
were protected by the Clause. Id. at 662. Finally, the court ordered that the 
privileged documents be returned and prohibited those who saw them from 
revealing their contents. Id. at 666.  
 92. See id. at 655 (considering whether the search of former representative 
Jefferson’s office violated the Speech or Debate Clause). 
 93. See id. at 659 (“May 20–21, 2006 was the first time a sitting Member’s 
congressional office has been searched by the Executive.”). 
 94. See id. at 657 (stating that Jefferson “argued . . . that the issuance and 
execution of the search warrant violated the Speech or Debate Clause”). 
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In determining that the legislative privilege was violated, the 
court followed its holding in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
v. Williams.95 The D.C. District Court, in Brown, created an 
extremely broad testimonial privilege in civil suits.96 Specifically, 
the Brown court protected not only direct questioning about 
legislative action but also documents referring to such acts.97  
In following Brown, the Rayburn court explained that the 
holding in Brown was rooted in a concern that document 
disclosure would “distract[]” legislators.98 Rayburn warned that 
without a document privilege, “the possibility of compelled 
disclosure may . . . chill the exchange of views with respect to 
legislative activity.”99 Based on this reasoning, the Rayburn court 
concluded that discovery of legislative act documents should 
similarly be prohibited in criminal suits.100 Because Jefferson was 
                                                                                                     
 95. See id. at 660, 663 (discussing the District Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit’s precedent on this issue and finding the legislative privilege violated); 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 423 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (“B & W’s claim at bottom, is to a right to engage in a broad scale 
discovery of documents in a congressional file that comes from third parties. The 
Speech or Debate Clause bars that Claim.”). The court considered whether the 
Speech or Debate Clause permits congressmen to refuse to respond to subpoenas 
requiring them to produce documents in a suit among third parties. Id. at 412. 
The underlying suit pertained to documents stolen from an attorney’s office by a 
former paralegal. Id. at 411. A House of Representatives subcommittee received 
the documents at issue. Id. at 412. Subpoenas ordering copies of the stolen 
documents were then issued to two congressmen on the committee that had 
allegedly received them. Id. The congressmen claimed the Speech or Debate 
Clause exempted them from compliance with the subpoenas. Id. The court 
determined that the Clause privileges congressmen from being forced to produce 
“documentary evidence” as well as being required to testify. Id. at 420. The court 
reasoned that such a privilege is vital to preventing congressional “distractions” 
that “‘divert [legislators’] time, energy, and attention from their legislative 
tasks.’” Id. at 421 (citation omitted). The court determined that the subpoena 
violated the legislative privilege. Id. at 423. 
 96. See Brown, 62 F.3d at 420 (discussing the Speech or Debate Clause’s 
application to documents). 
 97. See id. (stating that the Speech or Debate Clause’s testimonial privilege 
applies to “[d]ocumentary evidence”). 
 98. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that the Brown decision was based on the concern that 
document disclosure requirements would cause legislative “distraction[]”).  
 99. Id. at 661. 
 100. See id. at 660 (stating that a nondisclosure privilege must apply in both 
civil and criminal suits). 
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prevented from removing privileged documents before his office 
was searched, the D.C. Circuit held that his rights granted by the 
Speech or Debate Clause were violated.101 The court assured that 
this does not mean courts cannot review a legislator’s claim of 
privilege.102 Pursuant to its holding, the court ordered that the 
privileged documents be returned to Jefferson.103 The 
Government, however, was permitted to retain the nonprivileged 
documents.104 
B. The Ninth Circuit: United States v. Renzi 
The question of the Speech or Debate Clause’s application to 
document disclosure was also considered in United States v. 
Renzi.105 In Renzi, former Arizona Congressman Richard Renzi 
                                                                                                     
 101. See id. at 662 (stating that the search violated the Clause because it 
“denied the Congressman any opportunity to identify and assert the privilege 
with respect to legislative materials before their compelled disclosure to 
Executive agents”). 
 102. See id. (indicating that courts can review a congressman’s assertion of 
privilege). 
 103. See id. at 666 (“[W]e hold that the Congressman is entitled to the 
return of all legislative materials . . . that are protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause seized [during the search].”).  
 104. See id. at 665 (“[I]t is unnecessary to order the return of non-privileged 
materials as a further remedy for the violation of the Clause.”).  
 105. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that the “actions for which [Renzi was] prosecuted [lay] beyond [the] limits” of 
the Speech or Debate Clause). The court considered the role of the Speech or 
Debate Clause in the criminal investigation of former Arizona Congressman 
Richard G. Renzi. Id. at 1016. Renzi was indicted for “public corruption charges 
of extortion, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy.” Id. at 
1018. Specifically, Renzi was accused of promising legislative action that would 
benefit parties who agreed to purchase a particular piece of land. Id. at 1016. 
Purchase of the land would allow its owner to repay a debt owed to Renzi. Id. 
Renzi contended that the land negotiations were legislative acts. Id. He argued 
that his actions were immune from suit under the Speech or Debate Clause. Id. 
Additionally, he contested the Government’s use of what he believed to be 
legislative act evidence to obtain a grand jury indictment. Id. Renzi requested a 
hearing at which the Government would have to show that it had not used 
evidence that he believed was protected by the privilege. Id. He argued that all 
the evidence relating to the land negotiations should have been suppressed. Id. 
First, the court determined that the land negotiations were not legislative acts. 
Id. at 1023. Next, the court concluded that the indictment was not “caused” by 
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was indicted for promising legislative action that would benefit 
parties who agreed to purchase a particular piece of land.106 
Purchase of the land would allow its owner to repay a debt owed 
to Renzi.107 Throughout this discussion, this incident will be 
referred to as the land negotiations. Renzi first attempted to 
obtain the Clause’s liability, testimonial, and evidentiary 
privileges.108 In doing so, Renzi argued that his land negotiations 
were legislative acts.109 The court disagreed for two reasons.110 
First, the land negotiations did not qualify because they were not 
completed legislative actions.111 The court refused to broaden the 
meaning of legislative acts to include discussions leading up to 
legislative action or promises of future legislative action.112 
Second, the land negotiations were not privileged because 
accepting a bribe does not have the requisite relationship to the 
legislative process.113  
                                                                                                     
the use of privileged legislative act evidence. Id. at 1031. Although the 
prosecution conceded that privileged documents had been shown to the jury, 
they were not necessary to obtain the indictment. Id. at 1031−32. Therefore, the 
indictment was permitted to stand. Id. Finally, the court expressly disagreed 
with the D.C. Circuit by permitting review of documentary evidence referencing 
legislative acts when the underlying action is not privileged. Id. at 1036. The 
court upheld the district court judgment and dismissed each of Renzi’s causes of 
action. Id.  
 106. See id. at 1016 (explaining the basis for Renzi’s indictment). 
 107. See id. (explaining the basis for Renzi’s indictment).  
 108. See id. at 1020 (explaining that if the charged actions qualified as 
legislative acts, the Government could not prosecute Renzi for them, the 
Government could not force him or his aides to testify about them, and 
“evidence of those acts could not be introduced to any jury, grand or petit” 
(citation omitted)).  
 109. See id. at 1016 (“[H]e claims that the public corruption charges against 
him amount to prosecution on account of his privileged ‘legislative acts’ . . . .’’). 
 110. See id. at 1022−27 (giving two reasons why Renzi’s action did not 
qualify as a legislative act).  
 111. See id. at 1022 (“Completed ‘legislative acts’ are protected; promises of 
future acts are not.” (citation omitted)).  
 112. See id. at 1023 (stating that “negotiating with and ultimately promising 
private individuals [to] perform future legislative acts” is not a legislative act 
(citation omitted) (emphasis removed)).  
 113. See id. (“‘Taking a bribe is, obviously, no part of the legislative process 
or function; it is not a legislative act. It is not, by any conceivable interpretation, 
an act performed as part of or even incident to the role of legislator.’” (citation 
omitted)).  
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Renzi also argued that the indictment must be thrown out 
because the grand jury was presented with privileged evidence.114 
This argument also failed.115 Despite the fact that the jury was 
exposed to legislative act evidence, the jury could have made the 
indictment without it.116 There was sufficient evidence regarding 
the land negotiations, which were uncompleted nonprivileged 
actions, for the indictment to stand.117 
Finally, the court considered the issue of document 
disclosure.118 Renzi sought an extremely broad privilege, like that 
in Rayburn,119 which would prevent the Executive Branch from 
forcing the congressman to produce documents relating to 
legislative acts.120 The court, however, refused to follow the D.C. 
Circuit.121 The court criticized Rayburn, stating that the D.C. 
Circuit erroneously permitted the threat of “distraction alone” to 
cause the privilege to attach.122 Although Renzi acknowledged 
that potential distraction has a role in the inquiry, it concluded 
that distraction can only trigger the privilege in cases in which 
                                                                                                     
 114. See id. at 1027 (considering “whether the district court erred by 
declining to dismiss the indictment in its entirety for, as Renzi alleges, the 
pervasive presentment of ‘legislative act’ evidence to the grand jury”).  
 115. See id. at 1031−32 (“We therefore have no cause to grant Renzi the 
relief he seeks.”).  
 116. See id. at 1031 (stating that although the privileged documents “should 
not have been presented, we cannot conclude that they were ‘essential elements 
of proof’ that caused the jury to indict” (citations omitted)).  
 117. See id. (explaining that to obtain the indictment, the Government only 
needed to “introduce evidence of Renzi’s promise to support legislation and the 
circumstances surrounding that promise”).  
 118. See id. at 1032−39 (considering whether the Speech or Debate Clause 
confers a document nondisclosure privilege).  
 119. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding that the Speech or Debate Clause provides a document 
nondisclosure privilege).  
 120. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1033 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(explaining that Renzi sought to “preclude the Executive from obtaining and 
reviewing ‘legislative act’ evidence”).  
 121. See id. at 1034 (“[W]e cannot agree with our esteemed colleagues on the 
D.C. Circuit.”).  
 122. See id. (“Rayburn rests on the notion that ‘distraction’ of Members and 
their staffs from their legislative tasks is a principal concern of the Clause, and 
that distraction alone can therefore serve as a touchstone for application of the 
Clause’s testimonial privilege.” (citation omitted)).  
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the action at issue is privileged.123 The court held that when 
evidence is sought to prosecute nonprivileged action, here Renzi’s 
illegal land negotiations, legislators can be forced to disclose 
documents containing references to legislative acts.124 
IV. Resolving the Split: Narrowing the Scope of the 
Legislative Privilege 
In order to resolve this issue, it is important to carefully 
consider the text and history of the Speech or Debate Clause.125 
Additionally, it is essential that one study the effect that this 
very powerful privilege has on the values, such as self-
government, upon which the United States was founded.126 
A. A Look at the Text of the Speech or Debate Clause 
In both the Renzi and Rayburn opinions, the courts reference 
the current scope of the Speech or Debate Clause as set forth in 
Supreme Court decisions.127 A textual analysis of the Clause, 
however, does not support the extremely broad reach it is given 
by courts today.128  
                                                                                                     
 123. See id. at 1035 (stating the “concern for distraction alone precludes 
inquiry only when the underling action is itself precluded”).  
 124. See id. at 1036 (indicating that “documentary ‘legislative act’ evidence” 
can be reviewed as “part of an investigation into unprotected activity”).  
 125. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7 (1982) (stating that two 
methods of constitutional interpretation are the “textual argument” and the 
“[h]istorical argument”).  
 126. See id. at 94 (“It is the character, or ethos, of the American polity that is 
advanced in ethical argument as the source from which particular decisions 
derive.”).  
 127. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1021−23 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause); 
United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(same).  
 128. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 25−38 (discussing the “textual 
argument” as a method of constitutional interpretation). In this chapter, Bobbitt 
explains that the “textual argument” is based “on a sort of ongoing social 
contract, whose terms are given their contemporary meanings continually 
reaffirmed by the refusal of the People to amend the instrument.” Id. at 26. 
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Rayburn applied Brewster’s standard for interpreting the 
“speech or debate” portion of the Clause, stating that “the 
Supreme Court has limited the scope to conduct that is an 
integral part of ‘the due functioning of the legislative process.’”129 
Renzi quoted similar language from Brewster.130 Additionally, 
Renzi cited Kilbourn for the assertion that the Clause protects 
more than just “‘words spoken in debate.’”131 Such 
interpretations, however, impermissibly ignore the contemporary 
meaning of the Clause’s actual language.132  
According to Webster’s dictionary, “speech” is defined as “the 
communication or expression of thoughts in spoken words.”133 
“Debate” is defined as “a contention by words or arguments.”134 
Each of these definitions requires words. Including legislators’ 
actions within the phrase “speech or debate” simply because they 
have a strong connection to legislating greatly deviates from the 
modern understanding of the Clause’s language.135  
To resolve the issue of whether the Clause provides a 
nondisclosure privilege, the phrase “they shall not be questioned 
in any other Place” should also be assessed through a textual 
interpretation.136 The operative word in this phrase is 
                                                                                                     
Thus, a textual constitutional analysis applies the modern meanings of words in 
order to interpret portions of the Constitution. Id. at 33.  
 129. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 659 (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 
501, 513 (1972)) (emphasis added).  
 130. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1021−22. 
 131. Id. at 1021 (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880)). 
 132. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 30 (stating that the textual approach to 
constitutional analysis “give[s] absolute affect to the words of the Constitution”).  
 133. Speech Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster. 
com/dictionary/speech (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (emphasis added) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 134. Debate Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster. 
com/dictionary/debate (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (emphasis added) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 135. See, e.g., Brewster v. United States, 408 U.S. 501, 515−16 (1972) 
(stating that the Clause applies to “an act which was clearly a part of the 
legislative process—the due functioning of the process” (emphasis added)); see 
also BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 26 (stating that the textual constitutional 
analysis uses the current meanings of the words in the text).  
 136. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 25−38 (discussing the “textual 
argument” as a method of constitutional interpretation). 
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“questioned,” which is defined as “to ask a question of or 
about.”137 The word “question” is defined as “a form of words 
addressed to a person in order to elicit information or evoke a 
response; interrogative sentence.”138 It has also been defined as 
“an interrogative expression often used to test knowledge.”139 The 
plain meaning of the word “question” suggests that an individual 
be present in order to supply an answer to the questioner.140 
Additionally, the word “they” in the Clause refers to congressmen 
who are the subjects of the questioning.141 Thus, the explicit 
language of the Clause supports a testimonial privilege, which 
protects congressmen from “words addressed to [them] in order to 
elicit information” about qualifying “speech or debate.”142 In 
contrast, an inanimate object, such as a document, cannot be 
“questioned” in such a manner. A document nondisclosure 
privilege would improperly expand the legislative privilege 
beyond the text’s contemporary meaning.143 
B. The Legislative Privilege and the Framers’ Intent 
In addition to studying the Clause’s text, its history should 
be considered to determine the Clause’s application to a 
document nondisclosure privilege.144 As explained by John 
                                                                                                     
 137. Questioned Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/questioned (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 138. Question Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/ 
browse/question (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 139. Question Definition, FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary. 
com/question (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 140. See supra notes 138−39 and accompanying text (providing definitions 
for the word “question”). 
 141. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (showing that the word “they” in the 
Speech or Debate Clause is referring to “Senators and Representatives”).  
 142. See id.; see also supra notes 138−39 and accompanying text (defining 
the word “question”).  
 143. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 33 (stating that the textual analysis 
interprets the Constitution by using modern definitions of its terms).  
 144. See id. at 9−24 (discussing the “historical argument” of constitutional 
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Adams, the Constitution must be interpreted according to its 
original meaning “‘to preserve the advantages of liberty and to 
maintain a free government.’”145 The Speech or Debate Clause 
should be applied today in accordance with the constitutional 
Framers’ intentions.146 
The “original understanding” of the Clause can be defined by 
considering the circumstances of its inclusion in the American 
Constitution.147 The language of the Speech or Debate Clause is 
nearly identical to the parliamentary privilege granted by the 
1689 English Bill of Rights.148 The Framers included the Clause 
at the Constitutional Convention without extensive discussion.149 
Only minor changes were made to the Clause throughout the 
drafting period, and the final draft from the Committee of Detail 
had almost the same language as the Speech or Debate Clause in 
the Articles of Confederation.150 The Committee members 
unanimously accepted this final draft.151 Similarly, the Clause 
was not contested at states’ ratification debates.152 This nearly 
uncontroverted adoption of the Clause can be explained by the 
                                                                                                     
analysis).  
 145. Id. at 9 (quoting John Adams as support for the “historical argument” 
of constitutional interpretation). 
 146. See id. at 9−10 (stating that the historical argument considers the 
Framers’ intentions to determine the meaning of the Constitution).  
 147. See id. at 9−11 (“[T]he Supreme Court announced that construction of 
the Constitution must rely on ‘the meaning and intention of the convention 
which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification.’” (citation omitted)).  
 148. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 659 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that the Speech or Debate Clause very closely matches 
the language of the 1689 English Bill of Rights).  
 149. See JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW 87 (2007) (“The 
Speech or Debate Clause seems to have been little discussed at the Philadelphia 
Convention.”).  
 150. See id. at 87−88 (explaining the minimal changes to the Clause 
throughout its drafting).  
 151. See id. at 88 (stating that the final draft by the Committee of Detail 
was “approved by the entire Convention without dissent or even recorded 
debate”).  
 152. See id. (“[T]he Clause was completely uncontroversial at the states’ 
ratification debates and in the debates in the press.”). 
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historical acceptance of a legislative speech or debate privilege in 
American government.153 
Because of the lack of debate surrounding the adoption of the 
Speech or Debate Clause at the Constitutional Convention, 
records from the Convention itself provide little insight into the 
Framers’ understanding of the legislative privilege.154 After the 
Constitution’s ratification, however, statements made by the 
Framers and other individuals who were influential in early 
America provide information regarding the Speech or Debate 
Clause’s purpose.155  
James Wilson, a constitutional Framer, discussed the Speech 
or Debate Clause, stating:  
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the 
publick to discharge his publick trust with firmness and 
success, it is indisputably necessary, that he should enjoy the 
fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from 
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the 
exercise of that liberty may occasion offence.156 
Additionally, Wilson commended the Clause for supporting 
legislative independence.157 He said that it was “‘a very 
considerable improvement in the science and the practice of 
                                                                                                     
 153. See id. at 87 (stating that the Articles of Confederation and three state 
constitutions contained clauses providing a speech or debate privilege); see also 
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 30, at 1136 (“Presumably because the 
principle was so firmly rooted, there was little discussion of the clause during 
the debates of the Constitutional Convention and virtually none at all in the 
ratification debates.”).  
 154. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 30, at 1136 (explaining that 
there was minimal discussion of the Clause at the Constitutional Convention); 
see also BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 9 (explaining that “[h]istorical arguments 
depend on a determination of the original understanding of the constitutional 
provision to be construed”).  
 155. See CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 88−89 (discussing statements made 
after the Constitutional Convention by the Founders about the Speech or 
Debate Clause’s meaning).  
 156. Id. at 88 (citation omitted).  
 157. See Laura Krugman Ray, Discipline Through Delegation: Solving the 
Problem of Congressional Housecleaning, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 403 (1994) 
(stating that Wilson commended the Speech or Debate Clause for “its role in 
securing legislative independence”).  
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government.’”158 From these statements, it is clear that the 
Framers included the Clause to facilitate legislators’ ability to 
carry out their role as lawmakers by shielding them from liability 
for their speech.159  
Thomas Jefferson wrote about the legislative privilege in a 
petition to the Virginia House of Delegates.160 Although Jefferson 
did not attend the Constitutional Convention or sign the 
Constitution, as one of the drafters of the Declaration of 
Independence and a “founding father,” his understanding of the 
Speech or Debate Clause can provide useful insight into the 
Framers’ intent. Jefferson made the petition in support of Samuel 
Cabell, who was a member of the House of Representatives.161 
Cabell had been charged with seditious libel based on a letter he 
had written that spoke unfavorably of the Adams 
administration.162 In the petition, Jefferson wrote: 
[I]n order to give to the will of the people the influence it ought 
to have, and the information which may enable them to 
exercise it usefully, it was a part of the common law, adopted 
as the law of this land, that their representatives, in the 
discharge of their functions, should be free from the 
cognizance or coercion of the coordinate branches, Judiciary 
and Executive; and that their communications with their 
constituents should of right, as of duty also, be free, full, and 
unawed by any.163 
First, the circumstances of the petition provide information on 
the original understanding of the Clause.164 Jefferson discussed 
                                                                                                     
 158. See id. (citation omitted). 
 159. See supra notes 156−58 and accompanying text (providing quotations 
from James Wilson, one of the Constitution’s Framers, about the Speech or 
Debate Clause’s meaning and purpose).  
 160. See CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 88 (discussing Jefferson’s comments on 
the legislative privilege in a petition to the Virginia House of Delegates). 
 161. See id. (discussing Jefferson’s petition to the Virginia House of 
Delegates on behalf of Samuel A. Cabell, who was a member of the House of 
Representatives).  
 162. See id. (stating that Cabell “was charged with seditious libel for a letter 
he sent to constituents denouncing the Adams administration”).  
 163. Id. (citation omitted). 
 164. See id. (discussing Jefferson’s petition to the Virginia House of 
Delegates, which provides insight into his understanding of the Speech or 
Debate Clause).  
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the legislative privilege in a petition to aid a congressman who 
had been charged because of a letter voicing his opinion.165 This 
fact supports the assertion that the Clause was aimed at 
preventing the other branches of government from punishing 
congressmen who express unpopular views.166 Second, in this 
statement, Jefferson, like Wilson, indicates that the legislative 
privilege is aimed at enabling legislators to fulfill their roles as 
lawmakers.167 According to Jefferson, in order for the people to 
actively participate in government through their legislators, they 
must be adequately informed.168 Consequently, the legislative 
privilege was included to encourage legislators to provide voters 
with essential information by reducing their fear that other 
branches of government will punish them.169 
In addition to the quoted language above, other portions of 
the petition emphasized “the link between freedom of speech and 
debate on the floor of the legislature, freedom of communication 
with constituents, and popular sovereignty.”170 Jefferson 
discussed the need for free communication between legislators 
and the people in representative government.171 He asserted that 
if legislators are put “‘into jeopardy of criminal prosecution, of 
vexation, expense, and punishment before the Judiciary’” for 
statements that “‘do not exactly square with [its] ideas of fact or 
right, or with [its] designs of wrong,’” legislative independence 
                                                                                                     
 165. See id. (stating that Representative Cabell had been charged with 
seditious libel for a letter “denouncing the Adams administration”).  
 166. See id. (discussing Jefferson’s petition in support of Representative 
Cabell who was charged with seditious libel because of his controversial 
statements about the Adams administration).  
 167. See supra text accompanying note 163 (quoting Jefferson’s petition to 
the Virginia House of Delegates); see also supra notes 156−59 and accompanying 
text (discussing Wilson’s statements about the Speech or Debate Clause).  
 168. See supra text accompanying note 163 (quoting Jefferson’s petition to 
the Virginia House of Delegates). 
 169. See supra text accompanying note 163 (quoting Jefferson’s petition to 
the Virginia House of Delegates). 
 170. CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 89. 
 171. See id. (“‘[F]or the Judiciary to . . . overawe the free correspondence 
which exists and ought to exist between [representatives and the people] . . . is 
to put the legislative department under the feet of the Judiciary . . . .’” (citation 
omitted)).  
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will be impinged and representative government destroyed.172 
These statements provide further support for the argument that 
the Speech or Debate Clause was designed to promote 
communication between legislators and their constituents by 
protecting legislators from liability for such communication.173  
Lastly, James Madison stated that interpretation of the 
Clause must be guided by “‘the reason and necessity of the 
privilege.’”174 He warned that “‘[i]t is certain that the privilege 
has been abused in British precedents, and may have been in 
American also.’”175 These statements by James Madison indicate 
that the Clause should be interpreted only as broadly as required 
to accomplish its purposes.176 Additionally, courts must be careful 
when applying the Clause in order to prevent legislators from 
taking advantage of the protection for personal gain.177 
In addition to considering statements made by the original 
interpreters of the Constitution to determine the intended 
meaning of the privilege, it is also significant that the Clause’s 
language was largely taken from the English Bill of Rights.178 
Thus, the Framers likely intended the American Speech or 
Debate Clause to have a meaning similar to the English article 
from which it originated.179 Consequently, the English 
parliamentary privilege can be used to understand the 
interpretation the Framers envisioned when they used nearly 
identical language in the American Constitution.180  
                                                                                                     
 172. Id. (citation omitted). 
 173. See supra notes 170−72 and accompanying text (discussing Thomas 
Jefferson’s statements about the Speech or Debate Clause’s purpose).  
 174. CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 89 (citation omitted). 
 175. Id. (citation omitted). 
 176. See supra notes 174−75 and accompanying text (providing quotes from 
James Madison about the Speech or Debate Clause).  
 177. See supra notes 174−75 (providing guidance from James Madison for 
interpreting and applying the Speech or Debate Clause).  
 178. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 659 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that the Speech or Debate Clause very closely matches 
the language of the 1689 English Bill of Rights). 
 179. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 202 (1880) (“[I]t may be 
reasonably inferred that the framers of the Constitution meant the same thing 
by the use of language borrowed from that source.”). 
 180. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 659 (stating that the American Speech or 
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The concept of privileging parliamentary speech and debate 
is deeply rooted in English history.181 The English privilege 
emerged in the early fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.182 In the 
beginning, its scope was limited to shielding parliamentary 
speech and debate from civil suits.183 Over time, the privilege was 
expanded to include protection from Executive prosecution.184 
This expansion brought a period of lengthy controversy with the 
Crown regarding the privilege’s reach.185 During this era, 
monarchs, displeased with criticism of their policies by members 
of Parliament, asserted, “[T]he privilege ended where 
[monarchial] prerogatives began.”186 Conversely, members of 
Parliament argued that the privilege applied to any action 
related to their role in Parliament.187  
The contention regarding the reach of the parliamentary 
privilege was present in the case of Sir William Williams.188 Sir 
William Williams, in his parliamentary role as Speaker of the 
House of Commons, permitted the publication of Dangerfield’s 
Narrative of the Late Popish Designs.189 He was subsequently 
                                                                                                     
Debate Clause has nearly the same language as the 1689 English Bill of Rights 
granting the parliamentary privilege).  
 181. See CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 69 (“The privilege of Members of 
Parliament to be free from questioning in any other place for their speeches in 
Parliament is undoubtedly an ancient one . . . .”). 
 182. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 30, at 1122 (“Parliament’s 
privileges originated in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries . . . .”). 
 183. See id. (stating that the parliamentary privilege originally only 
protected members of Parliament from civil suit).  
 184. See id. at 1123 (“The free speech privilege evolved gradually and 
painfully into a practical instrument for security against the executive, an 
evolution triggered by basic changes in the functions of the legislature.”). 
 185. See id. at 1126 (explaining that parliamentary “intrusions into the 
Crown’s prerogatives led to a century-long battle over Parliament’s freedom of 
speech or debate”).  
 186. Id. at 1127.  
 187. See id. (“[T]he House declar[ed] that the privilege was absolute for any 
matter touching parliamentary business.”). 
 188. See CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 74 (explaining that Sir William 
Williams was “hauled before the King’s Bench on a charge of seditious libel” for 
an action carried out in his role as the Speaker of the House of Commons).  
 189. See id. (stating that Sir William Williams, while acting as the Speaker 
of the House of Commons, “ordered the printing of a pamphlet (Dangerfield’s 
Narrative of the Late Popish Designs) that was libelous of the Duke of York”). 
LIMITING THE LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE 2155 
charged with seditious libel.190 He raised the defense that his 
action was privileged because it was “‘done in [the] time of 
parliament, and ordered to be done by the House of Commons.’”191 
Despite his assertion of privilege, Sir William Williams was 
convicted.192 
Shortly after Sir William Williams’s conviction, Parliament 
passed the 1689 English Bill of Rights in response to incidents of 
monarchial aggression.193 The Bill of Rights included Article 9, 
which stated, “‘[T]he freedom of speech, and debates or 
proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in any court or place out of parliament.’”194 The 
legislative privilege guarantee was included for 
parliamentarians, like Sir William Williams, who were punished 
by the Crown for their parliamentary actions.195 Consequently, 
shortly after the Bill of Rights was passed, the House of 
Commons passed a resolution that pronounced the judgment 
against Williams “‘an illegal Judgment, and against the Freedom 
of Parliament.’”196  
Although Sir William Williams was convicted, the 1689 
English Bill of Rights was created to protect individuals in 
similar situations.197 This fact indicates that the English 
                                                                                                     
 190. See id. (stating that Sir William Williams was charged with seditious 
libel). 
 191. Id. (citation omitted). 
 192. See id. (stating that despite Sir William Williams’s assertion of 
parliamentary privilege, “[t]he judges disagreed”).  
 193. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 30, at 1134 (“[S]hortly after the 
indictment of Sir William Williams, James II published a Declaration of 
Indulgence declaring it to be his ‘royal will and pleasure that . . . the execution 
of all and all manners of penal laws in matters ecclesiastical . . . be immediately 
suspended.’” (citation omitted)). This Declaration gave the “executive power to 
nullify statutes passed by Parliament.” Id. In response, the 1689 English Bill of 
Rights “both abolished the suspending power and guaranteed the speech or 
debate privilege.” Id. at 1135. 
 194. CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 74 (citation omitted). 
 195. See id. at 74−75 (explaining that one drafter of the English Bill of 
Rights said that the Article 9 legislative privilege “‘was put in for the sake of 
one . . . Sir William Williams, who was punished out of Parliament for what he 
had done in Parliament’”(citation omitted)). 
 196. Id. at 75 (citation omitted).  
 197. See id. (stating that the 1689 English Bill of Rights was created for 
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parliamentary privilege was aimed at shielding parliamentarians 
from suits based on the content of their speech.198 Consequently, 
it can be inferred that the Framers of the American Constitution 
had a similar protection in mind when they adopted nearly the 
exact same language in the American Speech or Debate Clause.199  
In summary, the statements by James Wilson, Thomas 
Jefferson, and James Madison reveal two related purposes of the 
Clause.200 First, the Framers sought to protect legislative 
independence by shielding legislators from speech-based 
litigation.201 Second, the Framers aimed to help legislators carry 
out their duty of informing the public without the fear of 
punishment.202 These purposes must be interpreted with the 
Clause’s roots in the English parliamentary privilege in mind.203 
Rather than allowing the Clause to protect congressional action 
simply because legislators happened to discuss it aloud or put it 
in writing, the Clause must be understood in a much more 
limited sense.204 Instead, the Clause should be interpreted in a 
fashion that only protects as legislative action statements that 
could become the basis of a libel suit or speech-based crime.205  
                                                                                                     
people like “‘Sir William Williams, who was punished out of Parliament for 
what he had done in Parliament’” (citation omitted)).  
 198. See id. at 74−75 (explaining that the Speaker of the House of Commons, 
Sir William Williams, was convicted of seditious libel, and the parliamentary 
privilege in the 1689 English Bill of Rights was created to prevent such injustice 
in the future). 
 199. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 202 (1880) (indicating that 
because the Speech or Debate Clause has nearly the same language as that of 
the English Bill of Rights, the Framers likely intended a similar meaning).  
 200. See supra notes 156−77 and accompanying text (discussing statements 
by James Wilson, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison regarding the intended 
purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause).  
 201. See supra notes 159, 166 and accompanying text (indicating that the 
Framers sought to protect legislators from suit based on the content of their 
speech).  
 202. See supra notes 163−73 and accompanying text (providing statements 
from Jefferson about the role of the Speech or Debate Clause in encouraging 
communication between legislators and their constituents). 
 203. See supra notes 178−99 and accompanying text (discussing the 
parliamentary privilege).  
 204. Supra notes 178–99 and accompanying text. 
 205. Supra notes 178–99 and accompanying text.  
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The Rayburn and Renzi decisions show that the current 
interpretation of the legislative privilege has deviated from the 
Framers’ “original understanding” of the Clause.206 In finding a 
document nondisclosure privilege, the Rayburn court stated that 
“the purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is ‘to insure that 
the legislative function the Constitution allocates to Congress 
may be performed independently,’ without regard to the 
distractions of private civil litigation or the periods of criminal 
prosecution.”207 This focus on avoiding distraction to promote 
legislative independence is misplaced.208 The legislative 
independence that the Framers sought to protect was grounded 
in the goal of encouraging legislators to fulfill their duty of open 
communication with their constituents.209 This type of legislative 
independence necessitates a privilege that protects congressmen 
from speech-based suits, such as libel.210 The Rayburn privilege, 
in contrast, allows a legislator who has misused his position of 
power to potentially use the privilege to avoid liability.211 
Rayburn gives legislators an opportunity to shield from review 
documents that may contain evidence of wrongdoing merely 
because the documents mention a “legislative act.”212  
                                                                                                     
 206. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 9 (stating that “[h]istorical arguments 
depend on a determination of the original understanding of the constitutional 
provision to be construed”).  
 207. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 
 208. See id. (stating that the purpose of the privilege is to promote 
legislative independence by protecting legislators from the “‘the distractions of 
private civil litigation or the periods of criminal prosecution’” (citations 
omitted)). 
 209. See supra notes 163−73 and accompanying text (providing statements 
from Jefferson about the role of the Speech or Debate Clause in encouraging 
communication between legislators and their constituents). 
 210. See supra notes 159, 166 and accompanying text (indicating that the 
Framers sought to protect legislators from suit based on the content of their 
speech). 
 211. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662 (indicating that in an investigation into 
misconduct, legislators must be given a chance to review documents for privilege 
before their forced disclosure to the Executive).  
 212. See id. (stating that the Speech or Debate Clause requires a 
congressman to be given an “opportunity to identify and assert the privilege 
with respect to legislative materials before their compelled disclosure to 
Executive agents”).  
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Allowing legislators to refuse to disclose documents in an 
investigation of their misconduct is a far broader interpretation of 
the Clause than is necessary to fulfill the Framers’ goals.213 A 
privilege that could allow legislators to hide documents linked to 
crime goes beyond what is needed to protect congressmen from 
punishment for the content of speech that may be deemed 
unpopular or a misstatement of fact.214 Moreover, this 
opportunity for legislators to conceal their wrongdoing is the 
antithesis of the Framers’ aim of facilitating voters’ access to 
information.215  
Unlike the Rayburn court, the Renzi court permitted 
discovery of documents containing information about legislative 
acts in an investigation of nonprivileged action.216 The court, 
citing Brewster, stated that the purpose of the Clause is to 
“‘preserve the independence and thereby the integrity of the 
legislative process’” and that “‘financial abuses by way of 
bribes . . . would gravely undermine legislative integrity and 
defeat the right of the public to honest representation.’”217 The 
court stated that preventing investigation by the Executive and 
punishment by the Judiciary in such cases is “‘unlikely to 
enhance legislative independence.’”218 As already mentioned in a 
quote by Madison, the Clause must be interpreted in light of its 
                                                                                                     
 213. See supra notes 200−05 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Framers’ goals for the Speech or Debate Clause).  
 214. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (quoting James Madison for 
the proposition that the Speech or Debate Clause should be interpreted 
according to its “‘reason and necessity’” (citation omitted)); supra note 172 and 
accompanying text (providing quotations by Jefferson about the intended 
purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause). 
 215. See supra notes 163−73 and accompanying text (discussing Jefferson’s 
statements indicating that the Speech or Debate Clause was created to 
encourage legislators to fulfill their duty of communication with their 
constituents without the fear of punishment based on their statements).  
 216. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(indicating that the Speech or Debate Clause does not prohibit review of 
“documentary ‘legislative act’ evidence” when it is done “as part of an 
investigation into unprotected activity” (citation omitted)).  
 217. Id. (quoting Brewster v. United States, 408 U.S. 501, 524−25 (1972)).  
 218. Id. (quoting Brewster v. United States, 408 U.S. 501, 524−25 (1972)) 
(emphasis removed). 
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“‘reason and necessity.’”219 The Renzi court correctly realized that 
applying the Clause in a manner that would enable congressmen 
to hide misconduct, such as bribery, is not necessary to fulfill the 
Clause’s purposes.220 A nondisclosure privilege for documents in 
an investigation into legislative transgression is not needed to 
protect legitimate legislative speech or to encourage properly 
motivated legislative communication with the people.221 The 
Renzi court’s refusal to grant an unlimited nondisclosure 
privilege indicates that it also correctly considered James 
Madison’s warning about the possibility of congressional abuse of 
the privilege.222 
Renzi, however, in dicta, cited Eastland for its statement 
that “[w]hen the Clause bars the underlying action, any 
investigation and litigation serve only as wasted exercises that 
unnecessarily distract Members from their legislative tasks.”223 
This statement suggests that legislators can refuse to disclose 
documents by simply asserting that the underlying investigation 
relates to an action protected by the legislative privilege.224 
Because of the expansive definition of legislative acts,225 it will 
not be difficult for legislators to obtain this classification for their 
actions and prevent disclosure of documents.226 Such an 
                                                                                                     
 219. CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 88 (citation omitted). 
 220. See Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036 (indicating that the legislative privilege 
does not include document nondisclosure when the underlying action is not 
privileged).  
 221. See supra notes 200−02 and accompanying text (giving the Framers’ 
intended purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause).  
 222. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(indicating that documents containing references to legislative acts can be 
reviewed when the underlying action is not privileged); see also CHAFETZ, supra 
note 149, at 88 (giving James Madison’s warning that the legislative privilege 
was abused in English precedent and the American privilege could similarly be 
abused). 
 223. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036 (citations omitted). 
 224. See id. (stating that when the underlying action is privileged “any 
investigation and litigation” is prohibited as “[t]hey work only as tools by which 
the Executive and Judiciary might harass their Legislative brother”).  
 225. See supra Part II.A (discussing the broad interpretation of legislative 
acts).  
 226. See Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036 (“When the Clause bars the underlying 
action, any investigation and litigation serve only as wasted exercises that 
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interpretation of the Clause extends beyond the Framers’ 
intended protection against speech-based suits and is the 
opposite of the Framers’ aim of supporting legislative 
communication with the public.227 
C. The Speech or Debate Clause and the Need for 
Legislative Accountability  
Lastly, the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause and the 
permissibility of a document nondisclosure privilege should be 
considered pursuant to the “ethical argument” of constitutional 
analysis.228 This type of argument resolves constitutional issues 
by choosing solutions that “comport[] with the sort of people we 
are and the means we have chosen to solve political and 
customary constitutional problems.”229 Stated differently, this 
argument “uses the character, or ethos, of the American polity. . . 
as the source from which particular decisions derive.”230  
It is beyond dispute that one such “ethos” or “ethical 
commitment[]” of the American polity is the notion of self-
government.231 This is made clear in the Declaration of 
Independence, which is a reliable source for determining the 
values on which America was founded.232 The second paragraph 
of the Declaration states “[t]hat to secure these rights, 
                                                                                                     
unnecessarily distract Members from their legislative tasks.” (citations 
omitted)).  
 227. See supra notes 200−02 and accompanying text (giving the Framers’ 
intended purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause). 
 228. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 93−99 (discussing the “ethical 
argument” of constitutional analysis).  
 229. Id. at 95. 
 230. Id. at 94. 
 231. See Phillip Bobbitt, Constitutional Law and Interpretation, in A 
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 126, 135 (Dennis 
Patterson ed., 1996) (“A corollary to this idea is reflected in the ethos of self-
government and representative institutions.”).  
 232. See id. (“The proto-constitutional document, the Declaration of 
Independence, manifests these ethical commitments.”); see also James R. 
Stoner, Jr., Is There a Political Philosophy in the Declaration of Independence?, 
INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 3, 8 (2005) (stating that the Declaration of Independence 
“assert[s] a right to self-government”).  
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Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed.”233 In the very next 
sentence, the Declaration indicates that the people have the 
power to destroy the government if it fails to protect their 
rights.234 These statements clearly indicate a commitment to self-
government.235  
Additionally, the portion of the Declaration enumerating the 
wrongs of the English King shows the importance of self-
government.236 For example, the Declaration admonished the 
King because he “refused to pass other Laws for the 
accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people 
would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature.”237 
The Declaration then compares this refusal by the King to an act 
of a tyrant.238 The Declaration also indicates that the King 
“dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly” and he “called 
together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and 
distant from the depository of their Public Records, for the sole 
purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.”239 
By taking away the people’s representation, the King obliterated 
self-government.240 Because the Declaration of Independence 
gives the King’s infringement on the Colonies’ self-government as 
a basis for the American Revolution, it is clear that the concept of 
self-government is an extremely important “ethos[] of the 
                                                                                                     
 233. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis 
added). 
 234. Id. (giving the people the right to destroy a government that is not 
serving their interests).  
 235. See Stoner, supra note 232, at 8−9 (indicating that the Declaration of 
Independence stands for individuals’ right to self-government); cf. THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (explaining the rights of 
Man and the role of government in enforcing those rights).  
 236. Cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 3−28 (U.S. 1776) 
(enumerating the wrongs of the English King). 
 237. Id. para. 5 (emphasis added).  
 238. See id. (comparing the King’s action to that of a tyrant).  
 239. Id. paras. 6−7.  
 240. Cf. id. paras. 3−28 (discussing the King’s infringement on Colonial 
America’s self-government). 
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American polity.”241 Thus, it must be considered when making 
constitutional determinations.242 
Today, American self-government is achieved through a 
representative system in which the people elect legislators who 
will promote their interests. The integrity of the legislature is 
essential to sustaining legitimate self-government.243 It is, 
therefore, imperative that legislators be held accountable for 
misconduct.244 Because the Speech or Debate Clause provides 
legislators with a privilege that could potentially be used to hide 
legislative transgressions, it must be interpreted in a manner 
that eliminates, or at least reduces, the chances of such a 
result.245  
By holding that, pursuant to the Speech or Debate Clause, 
legislators must be permitted to “assert the privilege prior to 
disclosure of privileged materials to the Executive,” Rayburn’s 
interpretation fails to adequately account for the need for 
legislative accountability in a system of self-government.246 This 
holding gives the legislator who is accused of wrongdoing vast 
amounts of control over which documents the government is able 
to obtain.247 Even though the court states that the legislators’ 
assertions of privilege can be reviewed by the courts,248 savvy 
legislators will be able to avoid disclosure of potentially 
                                                                                                     
 241. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 94. 
 242. See id. at 93−99 (discussing the “ethical argument” of constitutional 
analysis).  
 243. See Ray, supra note 157, at 428 (stating the very important interest of 
“constituents in a fair and honest legislature”).  
 244. See id. (explaining that because “voters alone cannot purge their 
Congress of its malefactors,” legislative accountability must be obtained through 
other avenues).  
 245. See id. at 389 (explaining that the Speech or Debate Clause “provide[s] 
sweeping protection for members of Congress from investigation by the other 
branches of government”).  
 246. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007). 
 247. See Rothrock, supra note 61, at 759 (“By placing the initial, potentially 
unlimited control of Speech or Debate Clause privilege in the hands of the 
legislator being investigated, the Rayburn Court radically changed the 
distribution of the most essential investigatory element—information.”).  
 248. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662 (stating that Jefferson did not argue “that 
his assertions of privilege could not be judicially reviewed”).  
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incriminating documents by simply inserting references to 
legislative material protected by the privilege.249 Rayburn’s 
extension of the phrase “shall not be questioned” will make 
investigations into the misconduct of legislators much more 
difficult.250 This will enhance corrupt legislators’ ability to escape 
liability for their betrayal of the public trust. If legislators are 
permitted to use their position in government for personal gain 
without reproach, they are no longer working toward the 
interests of their constituents. Like when the King interfered 
with representative government in Colonial America, self-
government will be impinged if legislators are no longer working 
toward the goals of the people they have been chosen to 
represent.251  
Unlike Rayburn, the Renzi decision does not provide a 
document nondisclosure privilege when the underlying action is 
not privileged.252 The court, however, suggested that legislators 
cannot be forced to disclose documents when the underlying 
action is a privileged act.253 This interpretation is much narrower 
than the Rayburn holding.254 Yet it still provides an avenue for 
legislators to avoid accountability for impermissible actions. 
Because of the broad understanding of what qualifies as a 
protected legislative act, legislators can refuse to disclose 
documents revealing unacceptable practices if the underlying 
                                                                                                     
 249. See id. (stating that legislators must be given an “opportunity to 
identify and assert the privilege with respect to legislative materials before their 
compelled disclosure to Executive agents”).  
 250. See Rothrock, supra note 61, at 759 (indicating that a document 
nondisclosure privilege gives legislators control over which information the 
government can obtain in an investigation).  
 251. See supra notes 236−42 and accompanying text (discussing the King’s 
wrongdoing as set forth in the Declaration of Independence).  
 252. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(indicating that “documentary ‘legislative act’ evidence” can be reviewed as “part 
of an investigation into unprotected activity” (citation omitted)). 
 253. See id. (stating that “[w]hen the Clause bars the underlying action, any 
investigation and litigation serve only as wasted exercises that unnecessarily 
distract Members from their Legislative tasks” (citations omitted)).  
 254. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 663 
(D.C. Cir. 2007). (holding “that a search that allows agents of the Executive to 
review privileged materials without the Member’s consent violates the Clause”). 
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action is sufficiently linked to a permissible legislative 
function.255  
There are a number of disturbing Supreme Court cases 
wherein questionable legislative conduct was privileged because 
it qualified as a legislative act.256 For example, in Doe v. 
McMillan, the Committee on the District of Columbia compiled a 
report containing “copies of absence sheets, lists of absentees, 
copies of test papers, and documents relating to disciplinary 
problems of certain specifically named students.”257 The children’s 
parents brought suit for a violation of their “children’s statutory, 
constitutional and common-law rights to privacy.”258 The court 
found liability immunity for the legislators because “their actions 
[were] within the ‘legislative sphere.’”259 This finding was based 
on the argument that such an investigation is an “‘integral part of 
the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members 
participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to 
the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed 
legislation.’”260 Thus, the Court prohibited investigation into a 
potential violation of the Constitution and criminal and civil 
statutes simply because the conduct could be classified as a 
legislative act.261  
Similarly, in Eastland, questionable congressional conduct 
could not be investigated because it was found to be within “the 
                                                                                                     
 255. See Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036 (indicating that when the underlying action 
is privileged, legislative act documents cannot be reviewed by the Executive). 
 256. See e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 495, 507 
(1975) (finding that a subpoena alleged to violate complainants’ First 
Amendment rights was privileged by the Speech or Debate Clause); Doe v. 
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 309, 312−13 (1973) (finding an investigation alleged to 
have violated the complainants’ “statutory, constitutional, and common-law 
rights to privacy” was privileged because it was “within the ‘legislative sphere’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 257. Doe, 412 U.S. at 308. 
 258. Id. at 309.  
 259. Id. at 312 (citation omitted).  
 260. Id. at 313 (citation omitted).  
 261. See id. at 312−13 (stating that “acts within the ‘legislative sphere’” are 
privileged “even though [the] conduct, if performed in other than legislative 
contexts would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or 
civil statutes” (citation omitted)).  
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‘legitimate legislative sphere.’”262 In Eastland, a subpoena was 
issued to a bank that demanded the bank produce “‘any and all 
records appertaining to or involving the account or accounts of 
[United States Servicemen’s Fund].’”263 United States 
Servicemen’s Fund (USSF) brought suit, stating that the 
subpoena was issued for an improper purpose.264 USSF also 
claimed the subpoena violated its members’ First Amendment 
rights.265 The Court, however, found that the issuers of the 
subpoena were protected by the privilege because it was issued 
according to an “authorized investigation” and was “in 
furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress.”266 Consequently, 
like in Doe, an alleged violation of the Constitution by 
congressmen could not be examined because it was labeled a 
legislative act.267 
Permitting legislative immunity and document nondisclosure 
in circumstances such as those in Doe and Eastland diminishes 
legislative accountability in two ways.268 First, the immunity 
privilege prevents civil and criminal suits for legislative 
wrongdoing. Second, document nondisclosure limits 
investigations into wrongful legislative conduct, which restricts 
voters’ access to such information. Each of these consequences 
impair the legitimacy of self-government by allowing legislators 
to commit actions that are contrary to the interests of the people 
they represent. 
                                                                                                     
 262. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503, 507 (1975) 
(citation omitted).  
 263. Id. at 494.  
 264. See id. at 495 (stating that the complainants argued that the subpoena 
was issued for an improper purpose). 
 265. See id. at 492−93 (“We granted certiorari to decide whether a federal 
court may enjoin the issuance by Congress of a subpoena duces tecum that 
directs a bank to produce the bank records of an organization which claims a 
First Amendment privilege status . . . .”).  
 266. Id. at 505−06 (citation omitted). 
 267. See id. at 507 (“We conclude that the Speech or Debate Clause provides 
complete immunity for the Members for issuance of this subpoena.”).  
 268. See generally Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) 
(privileging questionable congressional conduct under the Speech or Debate 
Clause); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (same).  
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V. Proposed Solution: Limiting the Speech or Debate Clause and 
Increasing Legislative Accountability  
To narrow the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause so that it 
more closely reflects its text, the intent of the Framers, and the 
ethos of self-government, this Note proposes a two-part solution. 
First, the issue of whether “shall not be questioned” includes a 
nondisclosure privilege must be resolved. Second, the legislative 
acts that are protected under the phrase “Speech or Debate” must 
be narrowed. 
A. Document Nondisclosure and the Scope of the Phrase “shall not 
be questioned in any other Place” 
This Note proposes that the Renzi holding regarding 
document disclosure be adopted.269 Specifically, when the basis of 
the suit is not protected by the privilege, then the Clause should 
not permit document nondisclosure.270 
First, this will bring the Speech or Debate Clause more in 
line with the actual meaning of the words used in the text.271 As 
discussed in Part IV.A, the contemporary meaning of the word 
“question” requires that it be directed at an individual.272 This 
definition forecloses the application of the Clause to documents.273 
This test will greatly reduce legislative document nondisclosure 
and the privilege will more closely conform to the Clause’s actual 
language.274 
                                                                                                     
 269. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(providing the case’s holding). 
 270. See id. (stating that “documentary ‘legislative act’ evidence” can be 
reviewed “as part of an investigation into unprotected activity” (citation 
omitted)). 
 271. See supra Part IV.A (interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause using a 
textual approach to constitutional interpretation).  
 272. See supra notes 138−39 and accompanying text (providing definitions of 
the word “question”).  
 273. See supra notes 136−43 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning 
of the word “question”).  
 274. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Speech or Debate Clause’s text).  
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Second, this standard adequately protects the ethos of self-
government.275 By reducing legislators’ ability to hide documents 
containing information about misconduct, legislative 
accountability will be bolstered. This standard should increase 
criminal and civil prosecution for wrongdoing and improve voters’ 
access to information about corrupt legislators. As a result, the 
integrity of the legislature will be improved and self-government 
through representatives acting in good faith can be achieved. 
B. Narrowing the Meaning of Legislative Acts 
To obtain the protection of the privilege, a legislator’s action 
must be within the meaning of the phrase “Speech or Debate.”276 
The Supreme Court has indicated that qualifying legislative acts 
will be privileged.277 This Note proposes a new test for the 
meaning of legislative acts that will greatly reduce the number of 
privileged activities. In order to be classified as “speech or 
debate,” legislative action should be conduct that could be the 
cause of a speech-based suit, such as libel. For example, under 
this test protected action would include legislators’ statements of 
opinion, policy, or belief that could later become the basis of a 
libel suit. If an action does not meet this test, it should not 
receive the benefit of the Speech or Debate privilege. 
First, such a test adheres to the plain meaning of the words 
“speech” and “debate” in the Clause.278 Second, this complies with 
the intended meaning of the Clause as set forth by the 
Framers.279 The Framers included the Clause to promote 
legislators’ communication with their constituents and to protect 
legislators from punishment for their statements, views, and 
                                                                                                     
 275. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the ethos of self-government).  
 276. See supra Part II.A (discussing actions that are protected by the phrase 
“Speech or Debate”).  
 277. See supra Part II.A (discussing actions that are protected by the phrase 
“Speech or Debate”). 
 278. See supra Part IV.A (interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause through 
a textual analysis of constitutional interpretation). 
 279. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the Framers’ understanding of the 
Speech or Debate Clause).  
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opinions that could later be alleged untrue, libelous, or contrary 
to the law in some other way.280 This test accurately reflects these 
aims of the Framers.281 
Finally, the test will promote the interest in self-government, 
which requires that representatives be held accountable for 
wrongdoing.282 By requiring conduct to be linked to a threat of 
speech-based punishment, the circumstances in which legislators 
will be able to avoid document nondisclosure, based on a 
privileged underlying action, will be greatly reduced. This will 
help prevent the troubling results in cases such as Doe and 
Eastland.283 For example, in Doe the investigation and report of 
children’s school records, which potentially violated the 
complainants’ right to privacy, would not have qualified as a 
legislative act.284 Such an investigation could not lead to a speech-
based suit. Similarly, the Eastland subpoena would not have 
qualified as a privileged legislative act under the proposed 
standard.285 Reducing the types of legislative acts protected by 
the privilege will thereby increase legislative accountability and 
improve the legitimacy of self-government. 
VI. Conclusion 
In Rayburn, Congressman William J. Jefferson was charged 
with using his position as a legislator for personal gain through 
the acceptance of bribes.286 In spite of his alleged abuse of power, 
he was permitted to have documents returned to him because of a 
                                                                                                     
 280. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the reasons the Framers included the 
Speech or Debate Clause).  
 281. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the aims of the Framers when they 
included the Speech or Debate Clause).  
 282. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the ethos of self-government). 
 283. See supra notes 256−68 and accompanying text (discussing Doe and 
Eastland).  
 284. See supra notes 256−61 and accompanying text (discussing the 
disturbing result in Doe). 
 285. See supra notes 262−67 and accompanying text (discussing the 
disturbing result in Eastland).  
 286. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 656 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing Jefferson’s involvement in a bribery scheme).  
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legislative privilege violation.287 Thus, the D.C. Circuit created a 
privilege that facilitates legislators’ ability to escape civil and 
criminal liability.288 Renzi attempted to eliminate this 
counterintuitive result by stating that when an investigation 
relates to nonprivileged action, forced document disclosure is 
permissible.289 Its decision, however, does not go far enough to 
prevent legislators’ use of the privilege to hide questionable 
conduct.290 By leaving the possibility of document nondisclosure 
in cases where the underlying action is privileged, Renzi failed to 
remove a powerful tool that corrupt legislators can use to avoid 
liability.291 Because of the overly expansive definition of 
legislative acts, dishonest legislators will have little trouble 
linking an action that could become the subject of investigation to 
a permissible legislative function.292 This will prevent 
punishment of legislative wrongdoing and leave the voters 
uninformed. 
The proposal set forth in this Note should be adopted to help 
combat legislative malfeasance.293 By limiting the privilege to 
action that could be the cause of a speech-based suit, the quantity 
of privileged legislative action will be reduced.294 Additionally, a 
privilege that does not include document disclosure in misconduct 
investigations will enhance legislative accountability.295 This will 
                                                                                                     
 287. See id. at 666 (holding “that the Congressman is entitled to the return 
of all legislative materials . . . that are protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause”).  
 288. See id. at 663 (holding that the legislative privilege includes document 
nondisclosure). 
 289. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(permitting document nondisclosure when the underlying action is not 
privileged). 
 290. See id. (permitting document nondisclosure when the underlying action 
is not privileged).  
 291. See id. (indicating that when the underlying action is privileged, 
legislative act documents cannot be reviewed by the Executive). 
 292. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the disturbing results in Doe and 
Eastland because of the overly broad legislative act definition).  
 293. See supra Part V (proposing a new method of applying the Speech or 
Debate Clause).  
 294. See supra Part V (discussing a new method of interpreting the Speech 
or Debate Clause).  
 295. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the need for legislative accountability).  
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increase the integrity of representative government and fulfill the 
ethos of self-government upon which the United States was 
founded.296 
                                                                                                     
 296. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the ethos of self-government). 
